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Introduction to Pragmatism and
Common-Sense
Gabriele Gava and Roberto Gronda
1 The topic of common sense is central to pragmatism, both classical and contemporary.
In  different  ways,  Peirce,  James  and  Dewey  all  wrote  extensively  on  this  idea,
highlighting its theoretical complexity as well as its heuristic function in philosophical
inquiry. In more recent times, to give only one noteworthy example, Nicholas Rescher
published  a  book  titled  Common  Sense  (2005)  in  which  he  argues  against  those
philosophical approaches that downplay the epistemological importance of common
sense and tries to provide “a fundamentally pragmatic construal of the conception of
commonsense beliefs”  (N. Rescher,  Common Sense:  A New Look  at  the  Old  Philosophical
Tradition,  Milwaukee,  Marquette  University  Press,  2005,  42).  It  can  well  be  said,
therefore,  that  common  sense  represents  a  pivotal  term  within  the  pragmatist
tradition in that it  intersects with many other key-concepts such as the primacy of
practice, contextualism, cognitive pluralism, the implicit knowledge required for action
(know-how), the irreducibility of the ordinary world to the descriptions provided by
the sciences and pragmatic realism – to name only the most relevant ones.
2 However, pragmatism is far from being the only tradition of thought that has stressed
the importance of the notion of common sense for philosophical reflection. As is well
known, Thomas Reid and the so-called Scottish school of common sense rejected Locke
and Hume’s new way of ideas on the basis of the primacy of common sense; similarly, in
his 1925 essay A Defence of Common Sense, G. E. Moore formulated a criticism of idealism
that starts from the assumption that a certain set of commonsensical beliefs cannot be
called into question; in On Certainty,  Ludwig Wittgenstein discusses in detail Moore’s
proposal  and  uses  it  as  a  springboard  to  formulate  his  particular  version  of
epistemology, centered around the notion of hinges.
3 A question that is therefore crucial to understanding the pragmatist notion of common
sense is whether there is anything specific in the use that the pragmatists have made of
this concept. In this respect, one might argue that the classical pragmatists have simply
inherited the position of the Scottish school. This approach was widely accepted in the
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United States when Peirce’s and James’s versions of pragmatism were in their emergent
phase and it certainly exerted an important influence on all the classical pragmatists.
Yet one might reply that the classical pragmatists did receive the Scottish notion of
common Sense critically, introducing relevant changes. Notoriously, Peirce’s doctrine of
critical common-sensism stems from a critical appropriation of this kind: in his later
years,  Peirce  came  to  realize  that  some  insights  of  Reid’s  philosophy  could  be
accommodated within an ‘evolutionist’ framework like the one that he was trying to
develop. Of course, all this raises a further question regarding the relationship between
the pragmatists’ notion of common sense and the approach that is distinctive of the
Moore-Wittgenstein line. Still another question is whether the pragmatists, classical or
otherwise, in fact defend a univocal notion of common sense.
4 Alternatively,  one  might  also  ask  whether  the  avowal  of  common  sense  principles
implies  a  certain  kind of  pragmatism even in  figures  who do  not  explicitly  regard
themselves as pragmatists. Put in this form, the question concerning the relationship of
pragmatism and common sense is  much broader in scope and is  not limited to the
consideration  of  the  similarities  and  differences  among  different  philosophical
traditions. It is rather a question that goes to the essence of pragmatism itself. For if it
is true that endorsing some sort of common sense principles involves the defense of a
pragmatist viewpoint, this might point toward an essential feature of pragmatism as
such, or at least toward a characteristic which is fundamental to a particular form of
pragmatism.
5 But these are only the ‘tip of the iceberg’ of a complex set of problems. The aim of this
special issue is precisely to investigate this broad subject area by presenting a range of
views about the way in which pragmatism is able to understand and conceive of the
nature of  common sense,  its  role  in human knowledge and its  relevance for  moral
reasoning.  The  papers  contained  in  this  issue  address  the  relationship  between
pragmatism and common sense both historically and systematically. They assess the
historical  influences on the pragmatist  notion of  common sense,  in addition to the
similarities and differences between the pragmatists and other traditions which have
provided central importance to this topic. They also critically consider the conceptual
relationships between common sense principles and a pragmatist standpoint on our
belief and knowledge. No conclusive and comprehensive view is yet provided. Nor was
this our intention. Rather, our task will be achieved if the contributions that make up
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